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Resumen
La mayoría de mediciones de descentralización política solo consiguen capturar algunas de sus facetas. 
En particular, la excesiva dependencia con respecto a indicadores fiscales es comúnmente criticada 
debido a su incapacidad para valorar el nivel de autonomía ejercido por administraciones subnacionales. 
Por el contrario, esfuerzos dirigidos a la creación de índices de mayor cobertura han recurrido a la com-
binación de opiniones de expertos, un proceso susceptible de ser afectado por errores idiosincráticos. 
En este artículo propongo el diseño de un marco metodológico basado en el uso del análisis factorial 
bayesiano para variables continuas y ordinales. Este modelo combina eficientemente múltiples medidas 
de descentralización con independencia de su nivel de medición, y de esta manera hace uso de manera 
simultánea del rigor de indicadores fiscales y de la amplia cobertura que caracteriza a otros índices cuali-
tativos. Aplicando un conjunto de 14 indicadores a este modelo elaboro un índice de descentralización 
más completo para 33 países OCDE. Con el objetivo de ilustrar la importancia del uso de medidas de 
descentralización que no sean parciales, utilizo este índice para replicar partes del análisis exploratorio 
realizado por De Mello y Barenstein (2001) sobre la relación entre descentralización y corrupción, 
mostrando que esta relación es prácticamente inexistente.
Palabras clave: medición, descentralización, índice, métodos Bayesianos, análisis factorial. 
Abstract
Most measures of political decentralization seem to capture only specific facets of the concept. In particular, 
the excessive dependence on fiscal indicators has often been criticized since they seem unable to assess the 
degree of autonomy exerted by subnational governments. On the other hand, efforts directed at developing 
more encompassing indexes have had to rely on the aggregation of items developed by experts, a process 
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that is prone to idiosyncratic errors. In this paper I propose the development of a measurement framework 
using a Bayesian factor analysis model for mixed ordinal and continuous outcomes. This model can 
efficiently combine multiple measures of decentralization regardless of their level of measurement, and 
in this way make use of both the rigour of fiscal indicators and the wider coverage of qualitative indi-
cators. Applying this model to a set of 14 indicators I elaborate a more encompassing index of decen-
tralization for 33 OECD countries. In order to illustrate the importance of using non-partial measures 
of decentralization, I use this index to replicate parts of De Mello and Barenstein (2001) exploratory 
analysis regarding the relationship between decentralization and corruption, showing that such relationship 
is practically non-existent.
Keywords: measurement, decentralization, index, Bayesian statistics, factor analysis.
INTRODUCTION
During the last three decades governments all over the world have favoured processes 
of decentralization through the creation and strengthening of subnational levels of public 
administration. According to a World Bank study (Dillinger, 1994), 63 of the world’s 75 
developing countries with populations over 5 million declared to be involved in a process 
of transfer of political power to local government. This wave of political reform has been 
envisaged by politicians, the civic society and academics as a process that brings the 
government closer to the people and thereby improving democratic accountability and 
public sector performance.
Political scientists have pointed at the potential of decentralization as a policy to both 
appease ethnic conflicts by allowing empowered regional governments, and bolster political 
participation in general (Brancati, 2006; and Hutchcroft, 2001). The branch of Sciences of 
the Administration also underlines the benefits in increased government responsiveness and 
transparency stemming from the closer contact between the citizenship and its government 
(Huther and Shah, 1998, Shah, A., 1999; and Treisman, 2002b). From a more economic 
perspective, decentralization has been theorized to enhance growth and innovation through 
regional and local competition and to improve efficiency in the provision of public goods 
by better fitting the preferences of smaller and more homogeneous groups (Faguet, 2004; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011; Thieben, 2001; and Vo, 2010). However, there are 
reasons to believe that decentralization might produce some undesirable effects too. 
For example, the multiplication of layers of government might in some cases hinder 
accountability. Moreover, due to economies of scale, the smaller the government the more 
likely there is to be a deficit in human, financial and technical resources, which reduces 
cost-effectiveness in the provision of public goods. 
There is a large literature of empirical studies analysing the effect of decentralization 
on areas such as interregional equality, transparency, political participation, growth, 
inflation, or fiscal discipline; but results have often been inconclusive. The study of 
political decentralization on corruption represents a good example of this disagreement. 
Articles on this topic using a similar research design, namely regression analyses with 
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international cross section data, can be divided in two blocks: those denoting a positive 
effect of decentralization on government transparency, and those that find inconclusive or 
negative results. 
Huther and Shah (1998) found that fiscal decentralisation measured by subnational 
share of government expenditures was associated with enhanced quality of governance as 
measured by political and bureaucratic accountability and reduced corruption. Similarly, 
using subnational government expenditure as a proxy for decentralization, Fisman and 
Gatti (2002) revealed a negative relation between decentralisation and corruption, 
measured by The International Country Risk Guide’s Corruption Index. Gurgur and Shah 
(2005) found that decentralisation measured by subnational share of civilian government 
employment supports greater accountability and reduced corruption in the public sector, 
—these two outcomes measured by composite indexes that they generated—, and De Mello 
and Barenstein (2001) concluded that tax decentralisation was positively associated with 
improved quality of governance.
On the other hand, another group of studies have found different results. Treisman 
(2002a) indicates that nations which have more tiers of government tend to have higher 
perceived corruption, measured by the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI), whereas other indicators capturing features of fiscal decentralization such 
as subnational expenditure were not significant. In a continuation of this study, Treisman 
(2002b), also found that federal states are perceived to be more corrupt than unitary 
ones. Freille et al (2008), found that corruption measured by the World Bank’s Control 
of Corruption Index is higher in federalist than in Unitarian countries, although fiscal 
indicators such as subnational share of expenditure and revenue where associated with 
lower corruption. Finally, Fan, Lin and Treisman (2009) using data from surveys based 
on the concrete experience of businessmen found that decentralization measured by the 
number of tiers of government, the average area of the bottom administrations, and whether 
the lower tiers had some kind of authority in the different policy areas, were related with 
more frequent and more costly reported bribery. In addition, larger subnational shares of 
civilian government employment were also associated with bribery, although share of 
subnational revenue was found to be negatively related.
Shah et al (2004), Gil et al (2004), or Sharma (2006) have carried out reviews of 
the literature regarding the effects of decentralization in different areas such as fiscal 
balances, inflation, government accountability, responsiveness, political participation 
interregional inequality, or public sector size, and in all of them they have found opposing 
results like the ones I presented above. I argue that the lack of consistent findings in the 
study of decentralization is largely due to an improperly defined research framework. 
In particular there is a multiplicity of measures that are used rather loosely as proxies 
for decentralization. This is due to both the multidimensionality and complexity of the 
phenomenon of decentralization. In order to produce comparable findings that could be 
used to advance in the study of the effects of decentralization the concept needs first to 
be correctly operationalized. 
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I aim to tackle this problem here by generating a new index of decentralization for 33 
OECD countries that, based on sound statistical foundations, will be able to encompass 
most of the facets of decentralization. In Section 2, I review the different measures of 
decentralization and discuss the reasons why they are not entirely satisfactory; in Section 
3 I propose a new measurement framework based on the use of Bayesian statistics; the 
index of decentralization is presented in Section 4, where I also include a brief exploratory 
analysis to demonstrate how using proxies for decentralization can lead to misleading 
results; and in Section 5 I conclude by summarising my results and indicating how the 
index could be improved in future research.
THE PROBLEM OF MEASURING DECENTRALIZATION
There are two main problems associated with the measurement of decentralization. First 
it involves the quantification of power and its distribution, which are complex phenomena 
not easily amenable to measurable categories. In addition, there is a lack of agreement 
on the very meaning of decentralization. Scholars of Public Administration and scholars 
of Political Science have dealt with the study of decentralization, but unfortunately with 
too little interaction between their respective bodies of work (Hutchcroft, 2001). To this 
division a third discipline can be added: Fiscal Federalism, an academic area stemming from 
Economics which has largely contributed to the study of decentralization but unfortunately 
sharing the same lack of interdisciplinary contacts than the other two disciplines. 
Schneider (2003) indicates that each of these disciplines highlights a dimension 
of decentralisation which is treated as distinct and separable. According to the author, 
arguments from Public Administration focus on the administrative effects of granting 
local jurisdictions autonomy from central control in the form of policymaking authority, 
and control over the personnel and public finances; Political Science theories focus on 
the processes of mobilization, organization, participation, contestation, and aggregation 
of interests occurring at subnational levels; whereas Fiscal Federalism is concerned about 
the extent to which resources handled by each level of government have an impact on the 
functioning of the public sector. 
Having to choose between one of these definitions of decentralization seems rather 
restrictive; “Researchers who do not explicitly look at each dimension will mismeasure the 
type and degree of decentralization and draw incorrect inferences about the relationship 
between decentralization and other phenomena”, (Schneider, 2003: 35). Instead Schneider 
(2003) recommends conceptualizing decentralization as a unique entity, in which three 
interrelated dimensions can be identified: economic, administrative, and political. This way 
the points of view used by the three disciplines mentioned before can be incorporated. 
Regretfully the use of proxies that account for a specific dimension of decentralization has 
been the norm rather than the exception in previous studies. Here I present those that are 
most commonly applied.
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Federalist vs Unitarian and number of tiers
The simplest way to operationalize decentralization has been to use a binary variable 
capturing whether a country’s constitution declares itself as a federal or unitary state. This 
exercise represents a brute simplification. Rodden (2004) even makes the point that these 
indicators are rather loosely coded; identifying federations by relying more on common 
sense and experience than on the rigorous review of constitutional charts. Another simple 
way used to measure decentralization consists of recording whether regional and, or, lo -
cal elections are held. So, a variable ranging from 0 (non-democratic states) to 3 (fully 
decentralized states) is formed. These types of measures are, however, more frequently 
found in studies that are not focussed on decentralization per se, but rather look to include 
a variable that could control for its effect. 
Fiscal indicators
The most popular approach when it comes to measuring decentralization is to use fiscal 
indicators, such as those published by the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) group 
at the International Monetary Fund, which represent practically the only approach used 
for studies examining the relationship of decentralization with aggregated measures of 
macroeconomic performance. These indicators reflect different features of the economic 
size of subnational governments. Two of the most basics, and for which the GFS panel 
covers a longer time period, are subnational share of total expenditures and subnational 
share of total taxations. 
These measures possess two major advantages in the form of reliability and comparability. 
The GFS derives its indicators from national accounts, which in turn are rigorously 
calculated by each national department of statistics. In addition, they are precisely defined 
and it is straightforward to identify what they are really measuring. Second, the GFS has 
emphasized comparability by making a great effort at standardizing accounts from each 
country; nowadays covering 148 countries.
Nonetheless, and in spite of these merits, the GFS fall short in providing a full 
picture of decentralization. In particular, these fiscal indicators struggle to capture the 
level of autonomy enjoyed by subnational governments. As argued by Ebel and Yilmaz 
(2002), GFS indicators of expenditure do not distinguish the source of revenues (taxes, 
intergovernmental transfers, grants, etc.), making it complicated to evaluate the degree 
of independence allowed to subnational governments. For example, in many cases local 
expenditures are mandated by the central government or are spent on behalf of central 
government, reflecting a process of deconcentration instead of decentralization.
The indicator of subnational taxation offers additional information on autonomy degrees 
by capturing the percentage of taxes collected at subnational levels. Taxes are different from 
the total amount of resources, which is a better measure of wealth than control. “Taxes offer 
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the greatest degree of autonomy, grants, and loans offer somewhat less, and discretionary 
transfer probably the least”, (Schneider, 2003: 39). However, subnational taxation still fails 
to address properly the intergovernmental fiscal structure of countries because it ignores 
the degree of central government control over local tax rates and tax bases. 
The GFS has become increasingly aware of the shortfalls when it comes to measuring 
genuine autonomy, and recently it has released a new set of indicators more informative in 
this respect. They specify the percentage of conditional and unconditional transfers, and 
the share of intergovernmental transfers. The problem is that at the moment this data is only 
available for six eastern and central European countries in 2006. Nonetheless and despite 
improvements that are being made in this area, indicators based on monetary data will 
never be sufficient to describe the whole construct of decentralization on their own. 
Oates (1999) pointed out that one cannot differentiate whether observed deviations by 
fiscal indicators are due to genuine decentralization or whether they reflect differences in 
economic policy. Even if there was an identical allocation of functions amongst subnational 
levels of government across two countries, the picture of decentralization painted by fiscal 
indicators will generally differ if they didn’t have the same relative expenditure patterns 
across the whole nation. For example, given two countries that have decentralized the same 
set of competencies, the one with a larger portion of its resources devoted to national 
defence will appear to have, other things being equal, a lower degree of decentralization. 
In this sense, Stegarescu (2005) added that the economic cycle can produce significant 
changes in the relative size of government activities which might be confounded with 
real shifts in functions or resources between government tiers. For example, in a country 
where subnational governments provide unemployment benefits, subnational expenditure 
increases without an expansion of fiscal autonomy during times of high unemployment. 
Qualitative indexes
Some researchers have tried to overcome the limitations of measuring decentralization 
using fiscal indicators by developing qualitative indexes that potentially incorporate all the 
facets of the concept. These indexes are more encompassing than fiscal indicators, but they 
are produced by a less reliable and objective process. Here I present the two most exhaustive 
indexes available in the literature in terms of number of countries, years, and dimensions 
covered: The “Index of Effective Decentralization” from Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), 
and the “Regional Authority Index” from Marks et al (2008). 
Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) define their measure as a “nuanced index of institutional 
decentralization”. It covers 16 European and OECD countries, with eight observations 
that have been spaced in intervals of five years, from 1960 to 1995. It is constructed by 
averaging six indicators assessing fiscal, political, and administrative responsibilities of 
subnational government. A value between 0 and 4 is attributed to the following indicators: 
government structure, which identifies unitary and federal states at its extremes; election 
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of a regional executive, indicating whether elections are held at the regional level; election 
of a local executive (similar to the previous one); ability of the centre to suspend lower 
levels of government or to override their decisions; revenue raising authority of lower level 
governments; and revenue sharing, representing how public budgets are allocated within 
the hierarchy of governments.
The Regional Authority Index goes a step further in terms of completeness; it covers 
42 countries on a yearly basis from 1950 to 2006. Different items are designed to capture 
abstract dimensions that are summarized in the master concept of regional authority. This 
concept is in turn conceived in two domains: self-rule, which refers to the authority of 
a regional government over those living in the region, and shared rule, referring to the 
authority a regional government exercises in the country as a whole. Some of the items 
for self-rule are: the range of policies for which a regional government is responsible; the 
extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population; or the extent to 
which a regional government is endowed with an independent legislature and executive. 
An interesting development in Marks’ index stems from the use of a coding scheme. 
Items receive values from 0 to either 3 or 4, but in contrast with Arzaghi’s index, guidelines 
on how to allocate points for each item are included (Hooghe et al 2008). As the authors 
indicate the goal is to make the index inter-subjective, so that experts understand and apply 
it in a consistent way to arrive at convergent observations. These coding schemes make 
qualitative indexes more reliable and transparent. However, in the end, coding particular 
cases will usually involve expert judgment, no matter how clearly an item is formulated; 
“Expert coding cannot be reduced to an algorithm”, Marks et al. (2008: 117). In conclusion, 
qualitative indexes help to overcome some of the fiscal indicators’ limitations to account 
for the whole concept of decentralization, however, issues of reliability in general, 
and transparency and comparability in particular, remain when relying on qualitative 
indicators. 
A MORE ENCOMPASSING, ROBUST, AND INFORMATIVE MEASURE   
OF DECENTRALIZATION
In order to improve the measurement of decentralization I propose a Bayesian factor 
analysis model for mixed ordinal and continuous responses. In doing so I build upon the 
works of Pemstein et al (2010), and Hoyland et al (2012), where the same approach was 
used to estimate an index for quality of democracy and human development, amongst 
others. This model allows for 1) the inclusion of all aspects of decentralization; 2) the 
combination of measures that use different scales; 3) the elimination of idiosyncratic errors 
arising from subjective choices; and 4) the simultaneous adjustment for missing data.
As in the qualitative indexes presented before I combine different measures that 
can collectively capture every aspect of the concept of decentralization (economic, 
administrative, and political). In addition, the method that I use allows me to aggregate 
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different measures based on an objective criterion, the estimated factor loadings, which 
represent the share of internal correlation explained by each indicator. In other words, 
how much each indicator contributes to the construct of decentralization. This way, 
idiosyncratic errors that occur in individual measures when experts are asked to give a 
rate, or when different measures are aggregated using arbitrary schemes are eliminated. 
The prevalence of the latter is substantial. For example, it occurs when researchers aim 
to obtain a better measure of decentralization by taking the arithmetic mean of different 
fiscal indicators (Díaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011; and Thieben, 2001); but even 
qualitative indexes suffer from this problem. For example, Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) 
calculated an average for all the items that they assessed, and defended this procedure with 
the claim that each item is measured in the same scale (from 0 to 4). 
In addition, the combination of factor analysis and item response theory under a 
Bayesian framework facilitates the joint use of variables measured by continuous, ordinal 
or categorical scales without generating problems of misspecification. This is an advantage 
of the simultaneous estimations produced in Bayesian statistics. Quinn (2004) indicates 
that the difficulty of combining these types of measures using latent variable models 
has been a major limitation in the estimation of political concepts. Most latent variable 
models are only appropriate when the indicators to be used are either all continuous (factor 
analysis), all ordinal (item-response), or all categorical (latent class). Ignoring the discrete 
nature of the indicators can result in falsely precise and possibly biased estimates (Quinn, 
2004); discretizing continuous variables throws away information and reduces precision in 
estimates; while dropping variables in order to have a set of indicators with the same scale, 
reduces both precision and the availability of items that might be used to tap on specific 
aspects of the construct. The first of these problems can be found, for example, in Schneider 
(2003), where a factor analysis is inappropriately specified using four continuous variables 
from the GFS and two dichotomous ones representing whether regional and local elections 
are held in the country.
Furthermore, latent variable estimation from a Bayesian framework allows obtaining a 
measure of uncertainty of the latent trait in a robust, straightforward, and more informative 
way. The reliance of Bayesian estimation on Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, 
and the simulated draws from the joint posterior distribution of the model unknowns, 
makes it unnecessary to use large sample assumptions (asymptotic normality). That is, 
in small to moderate samples, these exact posteriors provide robust standard errors and 
confidence limits (i.e. credible intervals) for the estimates, regardless of the sample size. 
These posterior distributions of the model unknowns can be used to infer the level of 
uncertainty that surrounds every country-value of decentralization. I take advantage of this 
possibility by accompanying the point estimates of the latent variable with their respective 
95% credible intervals. This is a type of information that a frequentist approach would 
not be able to offer. As Levendusky et al (2008) point out, most analyses of covariance 
structure approaches treat the latent variables as nuisance parameters, and, at best, will 
produce point estimates of these quantities, conditional on estimates of the factor structure. 
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In contrast, in the framework that I propose the latent trait of interest appears explicitly as 
a parameter to be estimated. Lastly, Bayesian statistics can adjust for missing cases -under 
the assumption of missing at random- as the model of interest is estimated, without having 
to rely on second stage processes such as multiple imputation, which facilitates the use of 
incomplete although still informative indicators.
Data
A set of 14 measures of decentralization for 33 OECD are used in the estimation of the 
model: subnational expenditure, subnational revenue, subnational taxation, subnational 
employment, institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing, federal, 
constitutional reform, representation, law making, executive control, and fiscal control. 
These measures were chosen from the existing pool available in the literature according 
to three criteria: 1) reliability, only indicators that have been prepared through systematic 
processes are considered; 2) reflectivity, the measures given by the chosen indicators are 
not a direct cause or effect of the construct of decentralization, but a direct reflection of 
it; 3) relevance, indicators were chosen with the intention of making sure that all the three 
dimensions of decentralization considered in Schneider’s (2003) definition (economic, 
administrative, and political), are sufficiently covered. 
Subnational expenditure, revenue, taxation, and employment are used to tap on the 
economic facet of decentralization. The first three are fiscal indicators, which peculiarities 
have been recognized in the Section 2.2. Specifically, I use fiscal indicators published by 
the OECD as these are publicly available, unlike the GFS. Their most updated values are 
used (2010, 2011, and 2008, respectively). In addition, I include the subnational share of 
civilian employment —made publicly available by Treisman (2002a)—, which just like the 
other three indicators, it can be used to reflect subnational governments, relative size and 
capacity of spending.
Borrowing, institutional depth, policy scope, and fiscal autonomy, are used to tackle 
the extent of administrative decentralization; that is, the degree of autonomy from central 
authorities enjoyed by subnational governments. Borrowing is a qualitative indicator 
elaborated by the World Bank for the year 2000, which can be coded as a binary variable 
capturing whether subnational governments are allowed to borrow from financial markets. 
The other three measures are developed by Marks et al (2008) for their Index of Regional 
Authority and refer to the year 2006. Institutional depth can be defined as the extent to 
which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated. Each country-
year observation receives a score ranging from 0 to 3, and the following codes have been 
used to improve inter-rater reliability: 0 if a functioning general-purpose administration at 
regional level does not exist; 1 if the administration can be considered as a deconcentrated 
and general-purpose one; 2 if it is a non-deconcentrated general-purpose administration 
subject to central government veto; and 3 if it is a non-deconcentrated general-purpose 
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administration not subject to central government veto. Policy scope captures the range of 
competences for which a regional government is responsible. It can go from 0, where no 
authoritative competencies are granted to 4, where regional government competences exist 
in almost all policy areas, including immigration or citizenship. Fiscal autonomy defines 
the extent to which a regional government can tax its population. It ranges from 0, where 
bases and rates of all taxes are controlled centrally to 4, where the regional government 
sets base and rate of at least one major tax (personal income, corporate, value added or 
sales tax).
To tackle political decentralization, or the extent to which political movements at the 
subnational level can be articulated and play a part in influencing national politics I use 
federal, representation, constitutional reform, law making, executive control and fiscal 
control. Federal, is a binary variable coded by Elazar (1995), which identifies whether the 
constitution of a country defines itself as federal or not. The other five measures are items 
developed by Marks et al (2008) referring to the year 2006. Representation measures the 
extent to which regional governments are endowed with an independent legislature and 
executive. It ranges from 0, given if there is no regional assembly, to 4, if the regional 
assembly is directly elected. Constitutional reform, defines the extent to which regional 
representatives co-determine constitutional change. It ranges from 0, where central 
governments can unilaterally determine a constitutional change, to 3, where a majority of 
regional governments can veto constitutional change. Law making, captures the extent to 
which regional representatives co-determine national legislation. It goes from 0 to 2, and 
0.5 points are attributed according to the existence of the following features: regions are the 
unit of representation in the legislature, regional governments designate representatives in 
the legislature, regions have majority representation in the legislature, and the legislature 
with regional representation has extensive legislative authority. Executive control, defines 
the extent to which regions can determine national policy. It goes from 0, where no routine 
meetings between regional and central representatives are envisaged, to 2, where routine 
meetings can achieve legally binding decisions. Lastly, Fiscal control, defines the extent to 
which regional representatives can co-determine the distribution of national tax revenues. It 
ranges from 0, where regional representatives have no influence at all, to 2, where regional 
representatives can exert a veto over such issues. 
Model
In the latent variable model that I propose the set of indicators reviewed above could be 
conceptualized as imperfect measures of the unobserved construct of decentralization; with 
the index itself seen as a continuous (i.e. with infinite degrees of intensity) unidimensional 
scale, arising from their patterns of association of the 14 indicators used. 
The set of 14 indicators are ordered according to their measurement scale: interval 
or discrete. I assume that items from the Regional Authority Index are continuous since 
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very often experts give values in between their predefined discrete points (see Appendix 
1, where I include all the data used and generated in this study). This way, the 12 first 
indicators that I use are considered interval variables and are fitted as the response variables 
in a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). This model could be specified as follows:
 
yij = aj + bjxi + eij                             (1)
where j = 1,2,...,14  and i = 1,2,...,33, are subscripts designating indicators and country 
level observations respectively. In this part of the model yij represents the first 12 interval 
indicators which are considered proxy measures of decentralization; bj denotes the factor 
loadings describing the effects of the latent construct of decentralization on the observed 
measures, or put it differently, describing the index j’s ability to discriminate between 
countries with respect to levels of decentralization; aj represents the intercept; xi is the 
common underlying level of decentralization for each country that relates to the observed 
indicators; and eij , denotes the error term, which is normally distributed with mean 0 and 
variance s2ej. 
Following the work of authors such as Dunson (2000), Jackman (2002), and Quinn 
(2004) I upgraded the model in order to appropriately incorporate the two categorical 
indicators federal and borrowing, indexed by j = 13 and j = 14 , which can be understood as 
ordinal variables with two values, 0 and 1. This is done by mixing the previously specified 
CFA model with an ordinary item response model (OIR). OIR models were first developed 
to account for scales indicating order of intensity in questionnaires and they are based on 
the assumption that each of the discrete items is measuring a same underlying construct, 
which is only observed in a sequence of steps. 
In particular, for the case of a dichotomous variable such as federal, the probability of a 
country being unitary, P(yi13) = 0, or federal, P(yi13) = 1, can be expressed as a function of 
the latent trait decentralization, xi with, 
                              { P(yi,13 = 0 | b13, xi) = F (t–mi)  
                                P(yi,13 = 1 | b13,xi) = 1 – F (t–mi)                  (2)
where mi = b13xi represent the latent variable of decentralization multiplied by the factor loading 
of federal, F(.) is the function mapping from the real line to the unit probability interval, which 
here was taken to be the logistic cumulative density function, with tj  as the unobserved threshold 
for the latent variable, which discriminates whether Yi13 = 1  given b13 and xi. Finally, the 
error term from uation 2 is logistically distributed and is represented by zi with variance s2jz.
The logic of combining CFA and OIR is to build a joint distribution for a set of underlying 
variables, Y*ij, described by a mixture of linear and generalized linear models. The first 12 
underlying variables are untransformed, whereas the underlying variable for federal and 
borrowing are assigned a logistic link function. Therefore, the values of the elements of Yij 
will be now determined by a 33x14 matrix Y*ij  of latent variables and thresholds,
19000 C POLITICA 34 (8).indd   19 28/3/14   10:47:15
José Pina-Sánchez20
Revista Española de Ciencia Política. Núm. 34, Marzo 2014, pp. 9-34
           {       Y*ij       if variable j is continuous;
  
Yij= 
    1       if  Y*ij > t and variable j is dichotomous;              
(3)
That is, in the continuous part of the model, the variables are tapping on the latent trait 
through equation 1, while in the item-response part, the dichotomous indicators included 
are tapping on the latent trait through equation 2.
Like in a standard factor analysis, the latent trait xi is not observed, and the correlation 
between the different indicators across countries needs to be exploited to estimate the 
covariance matrix and within it bj, se2j , and sz2j . However, since the likelihood for the 
model is composed of a combination of latent constructs and factor (or item) parameters, 
changes in the latent trait can be offset by changes in the factor loadings, yet provide 
the same likelihood contributions. In order to overcome this lack of identification, and 
to rule out arbitrary shifts in location and scale in the latent variable, its distribution 
was constrained to have mean 0 and variance 1. This assumption does not have an 
impact in the validity or in the interpretation of the index as only relative performance 
is of interest and this performance does not have a particular scale. Then, after 
the distribution is constrained, aj can be identified from the mean of the observed 
variables,
 
and using the within country variation and the observed variables, xi can be 
finally identified.
The estimation of the model was carried out using WinBUGS, a free Bayesian statistical 
package, developed by Lunn et al (2000), which implements the Gibbs sampler (a type 
of MCMC algorithm) to calculate the posterior distribution. Diffuse priors were used to 
generate the initial values and to ensure that inferences are drawn from the likelihood 
function only. In particular, estimations are taken from 7,000 iterations of the posterior 
distribution, after “burning-in” the first 3,000 iterations. Additional information on the set 
of priors used, graphical tests of convergence, and the WinBUGS syntax used to specify the 
model is included in Appendices 2 and 3. 
RESULTS AND FURTHER COMPARISONS
All the factor loadings considered in the model are statistically significant, and point in 
the expected direction. The higher the value of each indicator, the higher the decentralisation 
score (see Appendix 4, where the mean standard deviations and 95% credible intervals 
for all the factor loadings are included). More interestingly, in Diagram 1 I present the 
decentralisation scores obtained for the 33 OECD countries analysed. Countries are ranked 
in increasing order of decentralization across the x-axis, with the y-axis capturing the 
number of standard deviations below or above the average country score. Circles show 
the locations of the means of the country scores and the horizontal lines represent the 95% 
credible intervals. 
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Diagram 1. 
Point estimates and 95% credible intervals for the country scores*
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*“Aus” stands for Australia, and “Aut” for Austria. 
At first sight the order of countries according to this ranking seems reasonable. 
Federal countries as Germany, Belgium, Canada, and the US, occupy the top positions, 
whereas small unitary countries like Luxembourg, Slovenia, Estonia, or Iceland lie at 
the bottom. The credible intervals reflect, however, a considerable level of uncertainty 
in the estimation of the country scores, which makes some of the most similar 
countries statistically indistinguishable. This problem affects especially Israel, South 
Korea, and Mexico, countries for which many of the indicators used were missing (see 
Appendix 1). 
Taking into account, the complexity of the concept studied and the model carried out 
—in which 101 parameters, including missing cases, need to be estimated using only 361 
observations— the credible intervals are relatively narrow. After all, this type of model 
uncertainty is present in all latent variable models used to estimate unobserved concepts, 
although it is rarely reported when the model is estimated using frequentist statistics. 
This is not, however, a problem to which proxy measures of decentralisation are 
prone to, suggesting a validity-reliability trade-off that could be used to defend the 
traditional choice of fiscal indicators —or any other particular proxy measure. However, 
the important limitations of fiscal indicators pointed out in Section 2.2 should suffice 
to deter researchers from that choice. To illustrate that point and the relevance of the 
more encompassing index of decentralization presented here I compare values from my 
index against subnational share of taxation and fiscal autonomy, a fiscal indicator and a 
qualitative index, respectively.
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Diagram 2. 
Values of decentralization using different measures*
*To facilitate comparisons the three measures of decentralization presented here have been standardised.
In Diagram 2 we can see how the levels of subnational share of taxation differ 
substantially from the index that I created, but also from fiscal autonomy, which underlines 
the incapacity of fiscal indicators to grasp the administrative autonomy dimension of 
decentralisation. In particular, the cases of Mexico, Italy, or Belgium stand out, as they 
show low levels of subnational share of taxation in spite of being undoubtedly decentralised 
countries. On the other hand, the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) 
show substantial level of regional fiscal autonomy, whereas when taking all other aspects of 
decentralization together they do not seem especially decentralised. In fact they lay around 
the mean levels of decentralization for the OECD sample of countries measured by the 
index presented here. 
To further my argument regarding the perils of using proxies to measure decentralisation 
I replicate some of the exploratory analysis presented in De Mello and Barenstein (2001), 
in which the relationship between decentralisation using fiscal indicators and the level of 
government corruption was studied. To do that I compare scatter plots for the subnational 
share of taxation and the index presented here against three measures of corruption for the 
year 2012: the International Country Risk Guide, elaborated by the PRS group (used in De 
Mello and Barenstein, 2001); the Corruption Perception Index, elaborated by Transparency 
International; and the Control of Corruption, elaborated by the World Bank (these last two 
used in Freille et al, 2008).
Scatterplots in Diagram 3 include lines of best fit, which illustrate a positive relationship 
between subnational share of expenditures and the three measures of decentralisation, 
but also how that relationship is attenuated in each of the three cases when the more 
encompassing index of decentralisation presented here is used. In Table 1 below I also 
include the specific correlation coefficients with their associated p-values, showing that two 
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of the positive and statistically significant relationships between measures of corruption 
and subnational share of taxation are not significant anymore when the encompassing 
index of decentralisation is used. 
Diagram 3. 
Scatterplots for measures of decentralization and corruption
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Table 1. 
Correlations between measures of decentralization and corruption*
Corruption perception Control of corruption Country risk
Subnational share of taxation .31 (.08) .44 (.01) .41 (.02)
Index of decentralization .12 (.5) .1 (.59) .24 (.17)
*p-values are reported within brackets.
Furthermore, for robustness sake I carried out additional comparisons using the 
subnational share of expenditures (see Appendix 5); finding the same types of attenuated 
correlations when the encompassing index of decentralisation is used. 
DISCUSSION
The importance of measurement cannot be overlooked, it is the first stage in the process 
of scientific inference, it establishes the building blocks of any hypothesis to be announced 
or tested. However, in the Social Sciences, measurement is often a complex procedure. Here 
I have shown that this is especially true for the case of decentralization. In the introduction 
I reviewed some of the contradictory results found in the literature regarding the study of 
the effects of decentralization on corruption, arguing that this is partly due to the different 
measures that have been used to operationalize decentralization. In section 2 I revealed 
the main flaws of the most commonly used measures of decentralisation, namely their 
limitations to either restrict the measurement to a specific dimension of decentralization, 
or to rely on subjective scales prone to idiosyncratic errors. For the case of the ubiquitous 
fiscal indicators of decentralisation, I demonstrated empirically in Section 4 how they 
suffer from serious problems of validity. In particular, I showed how such problems can 
result in the generation of misleading rankings of decentralisation, or even point at spurious 
associations between decentralisation and corruption.
To advance the academic knowledge in the area of decentralisation we need better 
measures. In the spirit of Pemstein’s et al Unified Democracy Scores (2010), I have 
proposed here the use of a framework where relevant and systematically created data 
available in the literature can be efficiently combined to form a more encompassing index 
of decentralisation. Specifically, I used a Bayesian factor analysis model for mixed ordinal 
and continuous responses, which can offer some interesting solutions to improve the way 
decentralization is measured. First, unlike standard factor analyses, the model presented 
here can be used flexibly and efficiently to combine any measures of decentralization 
available in the literature, regardless of the scale in which they are measured. Second, 
unlike indexes created by simple aggregation, the model presented here uses the internal 
correlation shared by the indicators included, which helps to identify the relative importance 
19000 C POLITICA 34 (8).indd   24 28/3/14   10:47:16
25Decentralization as a multifaceted concept: a more encompassing index using bayesian statistics
Revista Española de Ciencia Política. Núm. 34, Marzo 2014, pp. 9-34
of each indicator in the construction of the index, but also to eliminate any idiosyncratic 
errors affecting qualitative indicators elaborated by experts. Third, unlike similar models 
based on frequentist statistics, the model presented here can account for missing cases 
as it is estimated, which facilitates the use of measures of decentralisation that do not 
necessarily cover the same set of countries.
The index of decentralisation that I have elaborated shows an adequate level of content 
validity as it is made of 14 indicators tapping on the three dimensions of decentralisation 
identified by Schneider (2003): economic, administrative, and political. However, it could 
still be improved by the inclusion of new indicators. In this respect, Marks et al. have 
recently announced (In their Regional Authority Index website) updated values of their 
indicators for the year 2010 to be published in the next months; including a new item 
that captures borrowing capacity of subnational governments. Similarly, the index could 
benefit from the addition of indicators that help to account for political mobilisation and 
representation at the local level. For example, future enhancements of the index could 
include an indicator capturing whether local governments are elected through open list 
systems. The addition of such data would improve the validity of the index as it would 
underline aspects that are not very well covered at the moment, but it will also improve 
reliability, as it would allow using more data to inform the model. 
Once the measurement of decentralisation is perfected, I believe that ensuing academic 
efforts should be directed at adding a temporal dimension to the index. This could be done 
through the inclusion of a longitudinal structure (years within countries) to the model that I 
present here. Much of the data is now available, fiscal indicators from the IMF and OECD 
and the Regional Authority Index can be traced back for some countries to the 1950s. 
Other indicators do not show the same coverage, but they could be included anyway as 
long as they provide relevant information, since missing data —at random— can be easily 
accounted for within the framework suggested here. The availability of truly encompassing 
and longitudinal data on decentralisation would allow using more sophisticated empirical 
analyses, such as time series or panel data analysis, which would help to disentangle many 
of the presently unresolved questions regarding the effect of decentralisation on different 
matters; amongst which corruption is only one of them.
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APPENDIX 2: PRIORS AND CONVERGENCE
Every parameter in the model was assigned diffuse priors. This way, I put no a 
priori restrictions on the values that the parameters can or are likely to take, and their 
identification relies on the data through the likelihood function. As explained in the Model 
Section, in order to make the model identifiable the latent variable was constrained to be 
distributed as a N(0,1). In addition, as Jackman (2004) points out, this limitation of the 
latent traits to have a standard deviation of one suggests that the likely values of the factor 
loadings will not be massive; therefore I can express the prior uncertainty over the a and 
b parameters with independent N(0,102) priors. Following Jackman (2004), I also employ 
diffuse, independent, inverse-Gamma priors on the parameters of precision, 1/ s2j, which 
are approximately uniform over the plausible range of values for these parameters. 
In the estimation of the posterior distribution, as the number of iterations grows 
larger, the likelihood function gains weight at the expense of the prior distributions. In 
order to eliminate early values that were mainly generated after draws from the prior 
distributions, the first 3,000 MCMC iterations were discarded. In fact we can detect the 
MCMC algorithm reaching convergence before that figure. Diagram A1 below depicts two 
chains simultaneously run for a sample of the most complicated parameters to estimate 
in our model: the country values of Israel and Mexico (two of the countries with a higher 
prevalence of missing values), and the coefficients for the indicator federal, b13  and a13x.
The four parameters have a rather erratic beginning due to the choice of non-informative 
priors, but they all seem to have reach convergence even before running 300 iterations. 
Diagram A1. 
Convergence trace-plots
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APPENDIX 3: WINBUGS SYNTAX
model{
## Likelihood
 for (i in 1:33) { #index countries
    for (j in 1:12) { #index continuous indicators
      mu[i,j] <- beta[j,1]+beta[j,2]*fstar[i]
      x[i,j] ~ dnorm(mu[i,j],psi[j])
    }
    for (j in 13:14) { #index binary indicator
      logit(p[i,j]) <- fstar[i]*beta[j,1]-beta[j,2]
      x[i,j] ~ dbern(p[i,j])
    }
  }
## Priors on countries
  for(i in 1:33){
    fstar[i] ~ dnorm(0,1)
  }
## Priors on indicators
  for (j in 1:12) { #index continuous indicators
    beta[j,1:2] ~ dmnorm(g0[1:2],G0[1:2,1:2])
    psi[j] ~ dgamma(.05,.05)
  }
  for (j in 13:14) { #index binary indicators
    beta[j,1:2] ~ dmnorm(b0[1:2],B0[1:2,1:2])
  }
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## Hyperparameters
    g0[1] <- 0
    g0[2] <- 0
    G0[1,1] <- .0000001
    G0[2,2] <- .0000001
    G0[1,2] <- 0
    G0[2,1] <- 0
    b0[1] <- 0 b0[2] <- 0
    B0[1,1] <- .04 B0[2,2] <- .04 
    B0[1,2] <- 0 B0[2,1] <- 0
}
APPENDIX 4: FACTOR LOADINGS
Mean Std. dev. 95% CI
Subnational expenditure 13.02 3.77 (6.34, 21.11)
Subnational revenue 9.64 3.37 (3.35, 16.8)
Subnational taxation 8.27 3.16 (2.47, 14.91)
Subnational employment .63 .18 (.32, 1.02)
Institutional depth 12.13 4.68 (3.76, 22.05)
Representation 1.66 .35 (1.09, 2.43)
Law making 1.91 .36 (1.34, 2.72)
Policy scope 1.88 .4 (1.22, 2.77)
Fiscal autonomy .67 .16 (.4, 1.02)
Executive control 2.33 .50 (1.49, 3.47)
Fiscal control .65 .17 (.35, 1.04)
Constitutional reform .93 .28 (.44, 1.53)
Federal 3.22 1.92 (.14, 7.62)
Borrowing 5.61 2.17 (2.35, 10.85) 
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APPENDIX 5: CORRELATIONS
Corruption perception Control of corruption Country risk
Subnational share of expenditure .16 (.38) .32 (.07) .49 (.004)
Index of decentralisation .12 (.45) .1 (.59) .24 (.17)
*p-values are reported within brackets.
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